Saturday, October 28, 2017

Myths about Israel’s security model

Prime Minster Narendra Modi’s veiled comparison of India’s strike against militants along the Line of Control with Israel’s military operations in its neighbourhood exposes the admiration India’s ruling elite have for the West Asian country’s aggressive foreign and security policy. Speaking at a public event in Himachal Pradesh on Tuesday, Mr. Modi said, “Our Army’s valour is being discussed across the country these days. We used to hear earlier that Israel has done this. The nation has seen that the Indian Army is no less than anybody.” His comments raise once again the question whether the Israeli security model is desirable for India.

Feeble deterrence

In fact, such an aggressive, militarist policy is not a successful model even for Israel if we look at the broader picture. Decades of war have pushed Israel to a security dilemma — whatever its leadership does to minimise the security threats it faces actually deepens the crisis further. Take a quick look at Israel’s military operations against groups it calls terrorist. In 1982, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent troops to Lebanon to defeat the Palestine Liberation Organisation which was targeting Israel from southern Lebanon. Begin then famously said Israel would win “forty years of peace” after the war. But the outcome was more complicated than the status quo. The PLO retreated from southern Lebanon, first to Tripoli and then to Tunis. But the Israeli intervention stirred up the Lebanese civil war, kicking off another protracted bloody phase of fighting between different sects. Instead of winning peace for 40 years, Israel continued the Lebanese occupation for 18 years. By that time, the PLO had moved to the West Bank, but Hezbollah, a Shia militia which was formed during the civil war, had established itself as a sizeable military force in southern Lebanon and as an influential sociopolitical movement among the country’s disadvantaged Shia community.

In 2006, six years after it pulled troops out of Lebanon, Israel had to return to the neighbouring country to stop Hezbollah’s cross-border attacks. Israel bombed the country for 34 days and also conducted a major ground offensive. But throughout the war, Hezbollah continued the rocket attacks into Israel (almost 4,000 rockets in a month). Israel claims the operation was a success as it destroyed much of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. But in reality the war left Hezbollah more powerful in Lebanon’s fractious politics, while it amassed weapons and rebuilt its military might over the next several years. So the security threat Israel faces from southern Lebanon still very much remains.

Backfiring bombings

The story of Israel’s wars on Hamas is not substantially different. To be sure, Hamas is a violent group that has targeted both the Israeli military and civilian centres. But Israel has been unable to claim a moral anti-terror position against Hamas because of the continuing occupation and, to be more specific, its policy of collectively punishing the Palestinian people. Israel withdrew forces and settlers unilaterally from Gaza in 2005, but it never stopped punishing the people of Gaza, and Hamas never stopped firing rockets into Israel. Ever since the withdrawal, Israel tried everything its mighty military could do to weaken the Hamas in Gaza. In 2007, it imposed a brutal land, air and sea blockade on Gaza, and between 2005 and 2014, it bombed Gaza thrice. Both the blockade and the wars have triggered widespread international criticisms and even allegations of war crimes. The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 2008-09 Gaza war, led by the South African jurist Richard Goldstone, accused both Israel and Palestinian militants of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.

Another UN report, on the 2014 Gaza war, also reached similar conclusions. During the war, Israeli bombings killed 2,165 Palestinians, including 1,644 civilians, while militant attacks killed 66 Israeli soldiers and four civilians. But what has Israel achieved from this bloodshed? Hamas continues to rule Gaza and still possesses the capability to fire rockets into Israel. Even after all these military operations, if Israel is not feeling secure or doesn’t possess credible deterrence against militant groups, realists would suggest it should well rethink its strategy.

Low risk potential

Another argument why the Israeli model is not desirable for other countries is that Tel Aviv’s cross-border attacks were against relatively weaker powers. Israel is the only nuclear armed state in West Asia. By conducting cross-border strikes in Lebanon, Palestinian territories, or even in Syria, Israel doesn’t face an immediate escalation of a conventional war. Hezbollah and Hamas have the potential to file rockets into Israel, target its citizens and mount pressure on the country's political leadership. They could also make any Israeli ground operation costly. But they are largely guerrilla forces who use asymmetric tactics rather than posing any existential threats. So the risk Israel takes with its cross-border attacks is the human cost of such operations and hostile international public opinion. Israel’s history shows that it is not very bothered about either of these things.

India, on the other side, has two nuclear armed powers in its neighbourhood. The source of overseas terrorist threat it faces is Pakistan, a nuclear power with considerable conventional military prowess. It doesn’t mean that India shouldn’t act, but it should play within a limited hostility doctrine. It can’t risk a nuclear war. Moreover, India is a country that cares about its international image and international laws. It can’t go about violating global norms and then hope to play a responsible role in international politics.

Source:The Hindu

Tuesday, October 24, 2017

Darjeeling deadlock: On elusive peace

Delhi and Kolkata must urgently sink their differences and hold tripartite talks

The 104-day shutdown in the Darjeeling hills called by the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) may have been lifted in late September, but peace remains elusive. A host of factors is responsible for this, not least the sparring between the Centre and the West Bengal government over who should determine the next steps. That they are not on the same page was evident in the way the deployment of troops in the region was handled. On October 15, the Union Home Ministry wrote to the State government that it was calling back 10 of the 15 companies of the Central Armed Police Forces posted in the hills. In response, two days later Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee moved the Calcutta High Court and got a stay. What is more worrying is that the situation on the ground remains tense and fluid. GJM chief Bimal Gurung is on the run. While the announcement to end the shutdown had come from him after the Centre appealed to protesters and offered to talk, the State government has raided his properties, lodged several cases against him, including for misappropriation of funds and triggering violence. It has issued an arrest warrant against Mr. Gurung and declared him a “proclaimed offender”. In an attempt to exploit differences within the GJM, the State government propped up rebel Gorkha leader Binoy Tamang, naming him chief of a new board of administrators to head the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration, which had been set up in 2012 as a semi-autonomous body. Mr. Tamang’s elevation has divided GJM followers. Ms. Banerjee has also been holding all-party meetings — the next one is to be on November 21 in Darjeeling — to arrive at a solution, with the GJM represented by the rebel faction.

With peace yet to be restored fully, the Central and State governments need to urgently sink their differences, hold tripartite talks and meaningfully empower the GTA. The economy of the Darjeeling hills has taken a severe hit with both the tea and tourism industries having suffered huge losses and struggling to chart a way out. The tea industry, for example, lost almost all its second flush crop, with losses estimated at ₹400 crore and counting. With uncertainty prevailing in the hills and winter setting in, there is anxiety over whether the gardens will be ready for the premium first flush crop which is harvested between February and April. Tourists have begun to trickle back, but the peak season is over. With the West Bengal government looking to be in no mood to talk to Mr. Gurung, the political crisis is far from over. It was Ms. Banerjee’s initial statement that Bengali would be made compulsory in the State, including in the hills, that revived the Gorkhaland stir. She later retracted it — but securing the peace will take a more conciliatory attitude by all stakeholders — the Centre, the State government and the GJM factions.

source:The Hindu

Friday, February 3, 2017

H-1B visa in the spotlight


There are disconcerting signals from the Trump White House and Capitol Hill of likely changes to the H-1B non-immigrant visa programme in the U.S. for skilled workers in tech jobs. Indian IT firms have been among the top recipients of the 65,000 such visas made available annually via a lottery system, in some years garnering well in excess of 80% of them. However, President Donald Trump, driven by his campaign promise of “Buy American, Hire American”, now has this “specialty occupation worker” visa in his crosshairs. Shares in Indian IT majors took a nosedive last week when an unconfirmed draft executive order leaked to U.S. media houses appeared to call for reform of immigration rules for skilled foreign workers that would raise the salary eligibility for such visas to $130,000, reverse the extensions granted by the Obama administration to the Optional Practical Training programme for foreign graduates in the U.S., and institute a rigorous monitoring system for companies employing L-1 visa holders, intra-company transferees. Any hope that India Inc. may have of such executive orders not gaining the requisite support in Congress is likely to come to naught: at least two bills with bipartisan backing were introduced in the House of Representatives last month, both urging tightening of conditions for skilled-worker visas that are, in the government’s view, costing Americans jobs.

Notwithstanding the shadow of protectionism that it would cast on the bilateral relationship with New Delhi, this visa crackdown in the making raises troubling questions for the U.S. tech sector and the broader economy as well. Any significant hike in the minimum salary levels for the specialised jobs held by H-1B visa recipients will hit not only Indian IT firms but also the tech titans of Silicon Valley, including Microsoft, Google and Facebook. This will inflict pain on the U.S. economy. Similarly, unless skill-based criteria are used in addition to wage-level restrictions, numerous U.S. firms will struggle to fill mid-level jobs with qualified Americans. Indian firms have for years been the most rapidly growing investors in the U.S. economy. If IT companies within this group are impacted by onerous new restrictions, they would likely prefer to entirely offshore their operations to India. Ironically, that could lead to job losses for American workers. While Mr. Trump was elected into office campaigning for economic revitalisation and job-creation for Americans, his administration would be wise to think through all the possible outcomes that could result from ham-fisted policies in the immigration space.

Source:The Hindu

Sunday, August 14, 2016

Not a full-fledged State- Delhi crisis


In maintaining that Delhi is just a Union Territory, the Delhi High Court has answered some major and unresolved questions about the constitutional status of the National Capital Region. The Court has held that the special provisions incorporated for Delhi, under Article 239AA of the Constitution, do not negate the effect of Article 239, which empowers the Lt Governor to act independently of his Council of Ministers; in other words, the concurrence of the Lt Governor is mandatory for administrative decisions. Unless the Supreme Court adopts a diametrically opposite view, the Aam Aadmi Party, which has engaged in a turf war with the Centre over who rules Delhi, will have to abide by the categorical ruling that the Lt Governor is not bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Given that the Supreme Court had taken a similar position in the NDMC vs State of Punjab case, the Delhi High Court judgment is no surprise. But the popular debate will continue about whether the right balance has been struck between the Union government’s responsibility in exercising control over an area in which Parliament, other key central institutions, and foreign missions are located and the democratic principle that people are ruled by a representative government.

At the political level, one may read into the developments a political setback to Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, whose AAP enjoys a massive majority in the Delhi State Assembly. Mr. Kejriwal had been locked in a power struggle with Lt Governor Najeeb Jung and had championed the cause of making Delhi a full-fledged State. As for the Bharatiya Janata Party, it may read the judgment as a vindication of its position that Mr. Kejriwal must accept the constitutional limitations of his office. The AAP has questioned the relevance of holding elections if the winning party is not going to run the territory. It is also a fact that such a tussle for supremacy arises from personality clashes and particularly when rival parties are in power at the Centre and in the NCT. However, in the public perception, some questions will remain. Is it wise to put in place structures that are open to multiple interpretations about who really runs what aspect of the administration? Is it necessary to have an ‘aid and advice’ clause when the LG has a virtual veto, and the Union government the final say, over matters concerning Delhi? Would it also not be prudent to have a much less ambiguous legal and constitutional framework?

SOURCE:THE HINDU

Turkey talks tough with the EU- Syrian refugee crisis

Turkey’s European Union Affairs Minister, Omer Celik, has yet again said his country cannot overhaul its counter-terrorism laws in return for visa-free travel facilities for Turks. The much-derided quid pro quo forms part of the deal reached in March to stem the influx of Syrian refugees into Greece. Mr. Celik’s tough talk, coming in the wake of the failed coup in Turkey last month, will comfort nobody and surprise none. Many elements of the agreement between Brussels and Ankara on the deportation back to Turkey of large numbers of Syrian refugees who get to European shores already remains suspended de facto following the crushed rebellion, as noted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. This suspension is obviously of concern to the EU. For the March deal had led to a substantial reduction in the flow of migrants, falling from a daily average of about 1,700 prior to the agreement to as few as 48 by June, according to official figures. Mr. Celik’s reasoning against any relaxation of counter-terrorism provisions is that the exiled cleric, Fethullah Gulen, whose followers allegedly masterminded the coup attempt, is a terrorist in the eyes of Turkey’s government. Even assuming the allegations against the cleric are merited, the argument that protection against extremism can be enforced only through repression is a disingenuous one.

Such an assertion at best gives a handle to the potent politics of anti-immigration that has fed into the already toxic atmosphere of euroscepticism in parts of the 28-country bloc. Its most serious ramification was felt when Britain recently voted in a referendum to leave the EU, emboldening right-wing parties in France and the Netherlands. Against this backdrop, hard-line right-wing resistance against the grant of visa-free travel facilities for those holding Turkish passports was perhaps to be expected. The EU’s Schengen visa-free travel area, covering more than 20 countries, made it possible for migrants reaching European shores to move to destinations of their choice with ease. One of the fundamental principles of the bloc thus became a bone of contention among some of the founding-members and more recent entrants. Some among the latter began to barricade their borders, much to the chagrin of EU leaders. In the absence of a concerted approach to deal with the refugee crisis, the move to allow Turks to travel without visas was always going to be controversial. The EU continues to drag its feet over the issue. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, long reviled by Europe for his authoritarian inclinations, is clearly in no mood to be deterred by pious sermons after the failed coup.

SOURCE:THE HINDU

The crisis over Crimea

Russia’s claim that it had blocked attempts by Ukraine-backed saboteurs to carry out terror attacks in Crimea is the new flashpoint between the two countries. Ever since the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, Moscow has had a heavy military presence in the peninsula. Russian President Vladimir Putin has now issued a stern warning to Ukraine against “supporting terrorists”, while Kiev has put its army on combat alert. It is not clear who is actually behind the latest flare-up. There are two theories afloat. One is that Mr. Putin is talking up the attack in Crimea to up the ante against Ukraine. The episode allows him to portray Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, an ally of the West, as a supporter of “terrorists”. The other theory, the official Russian version, is that militants and Ukrainian special forces were indeed involved in the sabotage attempt, and two Russian soldiers were killed in exchange of fire. For now, there are independent reports confirming that there was a firefight on the Crimea-Ukraine border on Saturday night. Militants had targeted Crimea earlier as well. Last November, anti-Russian saboteurs had blown up electrical pylons, plunging Crimea into darkness. The real question is whether such militant groups have the direct support of the Ukrainian government. If so, Ukraine may be committing a major mistake. Retaking Crimea from Russia using force is simply not practical. What it could possibly do is to destabilise Crimea by violent means. But even this won’t serve Ukraine’s interests as violence in Crimea by external forces is likely to prompt Moscow to step up proxy wars in Eastern Ukraine, destabilising the country further.

Russia sees Ukraine as a front of the West in a larger geopolitical game, and is unlikely to make major compromises unless there is a deal between itself and Western countries over Ukraine. Kiev is but a small player caught in a great power game. It should make its choices carefully as ties with Russia could be pivotal for its survival as a stable, peaceful nation in the long term. The West has to realise that its belligerent response towards Moscow over the annexation of Crimea, including sanctions, has only complicated the crisis further. It should rethink its policies and enter into meaningful talks with Moscow to dial down tensions over Ukraine. Restoring trust between Russia and the West is crucial in tackling several other global challenges as well, including the Syrian civil war and the fight against the Islamic State. For its part, Russia has to get its priorities right. What is it gaining from destabilising a tiny neighbouring country and damaging its own position as a global power when its economy is bleeding? There is room for all actors to make compromises in their mutual interest.

SOURCE:THE HINDU

Friday, August 5, 2016

Giving India a global-scale bank-merger of SBI and associate banks

The proposed merger of the State Bank of India with its five associate banks and the Bharatiya Mahila Bank is a long-delayed and welcome move on the path to banking consolidation, especially among state-owned lenders. SBI’s takeover of its five subsidiaries and the three-year-old niche provider of banking services for women will, once consummated, vault the merged entity higher up the rankings ladder on the global banking stage. The resultant benefits to the lender and the economy are evident. The increased balance sheet size will enable the bank to obtain better pricing on both internationally sourced funds and domestic deposits, thus helping it lower lending rates and improve profitability. The added branch network and customer base will also help it expand reach and enable the lender to rationalise resources across the board. There are various estimates of the potential cost savings, with one projection putting the possible reduction in cost-to-income ratio at 1 percentage point. The lender’s increased size, in terms of assets, will also give it the requisite muscle to take on new competition from larger banking entities that are likely to be created by consolidation in the banking industry. The Bank Board Bureau has been tasked with overseeing a restructuring among public sector banks in keeping with the government’s aim of reducing the number of state-owned lenders and improving their financial health.

The merger will, however, pose its unique set of challenges. The scale of the task is substantial given the total staff strength. With more than two lakh employees, the parent will add close to one-fifth that number by way of additions posing a huge test in terms of integration of roles, salary, perquisite and pension structures and, no less importantly, work cultures. Much of the opposition from the bank unions stems from concerns relating to these issues. Customers of the smaller, community or regional market-focussed subsidiaries such as the State Bank of Travancore may be discomfited by having to deal with a larger, more impersonal lender, one where the size of their accounts may be viewed as comparatively marginal. For regulators, the new entity will throw up interesting oversight issues. Already identified by the Reserve Bank of India as the country’s key Domestic Systemically Important Bank, or too big to fail in simple terms, the enlarged SBI’s capital adequacy norms will climb and may require far more by way of infusion of funds than the Centre has committed so far. But such challenges must not be used to undermine the obvious benefits of merger.

Source:The Hindu