Mexico resembles a ‘failed state’, caught in a deadly trap, beset by every type of armed thug.
November 20 was the 100th anniversary of the Mexican revolution, the first major social revolution of the 20th century: a heroic deed carried out by two legendary popular figures, Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, whose victory was a victory for workers and peasant farmers: rights, agrarian reform, free, non-religious public education, and social security.
One hundred years later, paradoxically, the situation of Mexico “is analogous in many respects to that at the and of 1910: an obscene concentration of wealth accompanied by widespread social backwardness; distortion of the popular will; infringement of workers rights; the negation of basic guarantees by the authorities; ceding of sovereignty to international capital, and a oligarchic, patrimonialist, technocratic political class out of touch with the people.”
Add to this depressing catalogue of problems a war — or, to be more precise, three wars: one waged among the drug traffickers for the control of territory; one of the Zeta groups (criminal groups comprised of ex-military and ex-police) that rob and kidnap the civil population; and one of the military and special forces against their own citizens.
Violence
Starting Dec 1, 2006, under pressure from Washington, Mexican president Felipe Calderon launched his ‘offensive against drug trafficking’. The wave of violence that followed left about 30,000 dead.
Mexico increasingly resembles a ‘failed state’, caught in a deadly trap, beset by every type of armed thug: paramilitary and parapolice; bands of ‘legal’ and ‘liberated’ assassins; US agents from the CIA and DEA; and finally the Zetas, who target particularly central and south American migrants on their way to the United States. They are without a doubt responsible for the atrocious murder of 72 migrants discovered last August 24 in the state of Tamaulipas.
Every year some 5,00,000 Latin Americans cross through Mexico on their way north. During the passage they undergo a wide range of abuses, from arbitrary arrest, robbery, and plundering to rape. Eight of 10 women experience sexual abuse; many are impressed as servants to criminal gangs or forced into prostitution. Hundreds of children are put to work. Thousands of migrants are kidnapped. The Zetas make the families of their victims pay ransom.
For organised crime it is easier to kidnap 50 or so unknown people for a few days and receive payments of between $300 and $1,500 than kidnap an important businessman. If the kidnapped person has no way to pay the ransom, he is killed. Each Zeta cell has its own ‘butcher’ to decapitate and dismember the victims, and burn the remains in a steel barrel. In the last decade, some 60,000 undocumented people whose families were unable to pay their ransom were ‘disappeared’.
Such barbaric violence concentrated in certain cities, like Ciudad Juarez, and in certain states, has spread to the rest of the country. Washington has designated Mexico a ‘dangerous country’ and ordered its consulate workers in various cities to send their children back to the US.
President Calderon regularly announces successes in the war on drug trafficking and the arrest of important narco leaders. He is content to have mobilised the army. The majority of Mexicans do not agree, because the military, who have no experience in this sort of intervention, increase the ‘collateral damage’, killing hundreds of civilians by mistake.
By mistake? Abel Barrera Hernandez, who just won the Robert F Kennedy Human Rights Prize, awarded in the US, doesn’t believe it. On the contrary he believes that the drug war is being used to criminalise civil protest.
The Obama administration believes that the bloodbath Mexico has become is a threat to the security of the US. In reality, the US bears a major share of the responsibility for this war. It is the main opponent of the legalisation of drugs. It is the supplier of (up to 90 per cent of) the weapons used in the violence, whether by the cartels or the Zetas or the army or the police. Moreover, the US is the main drug power: it is a major producer of marijuana and the largest producer of chemical drugs like amphetamines, ecstasy, etc.
The US is, above all, the largest drug market in the world, with 7 million cocaine addicts. And the mafias that operate in its territory make the largest profits off of the sale of drugs: 90 per cent, or $45 billion per year. In contrast, the total made by all of the Latin American cartels come to a mere 10 per cent.
Yet again, rather than give its neighbours (bad) advice, which has precipitated Mexico into a hellish war, Washington should clean its own house.
Monday, December 27, 2010
Shortcomings in functioning of Panchayati Raj Institutions:CAG
The Comptroller and Auditor General has expressed displeasure over tardy functioning of Panchayati Raj Institutions in Uttar Pradesh, citing allocation of funds ''without any need-based assessment'' and inability to utilise money in a time-bound manner.
In its report on the working of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in UP for the year 2007-08, the CAG has said "as per recommendation of the 11th Finance Commission, the Centre had released Rs 933.71 crore to the state government during 2001-05 for development work like road, water supply and sanitation.
Out of this amount, the state government released Rs 921.88 crore to PRIs and retained Rs 11.84 crore at their level.
Further, Rs 43.21 crore lapsed at the Directorate (state Panchayati Raj department), due to non-utilisation of funds, the CAG said.
The report pointed out that out of the total amount of non-utilised funds, Rs 42.07 crore was meant for creating database on finances.
"The 11th Finance Commission had recommended that a database on the finances of the PRIs should be developed at district, state and central levels and the same should be made easily accessible by means of computerisation," the report said.
"The data were to be collected and compiled in standard formats prescribed by the CAG. This would have facilitated comparison of performances of the PRIs among the states.
The database was, however, not developed as of May, 2008."
In August 2005, the Centre rejected the state government’s request for the extension of time and thus, the purpose of high priority to the expenditure on creation of database and maintenance of accounts for providing accurate information on the finances of PRIs was defeated," the CAG said.
The CAG also pointed towards the non-functionality of District Planning Committees (DPCs), before which Zila Panchayats were supposed to submit their development programmes, which were to include development plans of the Kshetra Panchayats and the Gram Panchayats involved.
However, since these DPCs "remained non-functional as of June 2008", despite the state government having passed an order for the constitution of these in February 2007, there was no effective monitoring of the development programmes, the CAG report said.
Underscoring these shortcomings in the functioning of PRIs in the state, the CAG has emphasised on the need for ensuring creation of a database on finances "as per recommendations of the 11th Finance Commission and the 12th Finance Commission".
The CAG has further said that the grants should be utilised in a time-bound manner to derive the intended benefit and the state government should ensure that District Planning Committees are effective and functional.
In its report on the working of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in UP for the year 2007-08, the CAG has said "as per recommendation of the 11th Finance Commission, the Centre had released Rs 933.71 crore to the state government during 2001-05 for development work like road, water supply and sanitation.
Out of this amount, the state government released Rs 921.88 crore to PRIs and retained Rs 11.84 crore at their level.
Further, Rs 43.21 crore lapsed at the Directorate (state Panchayati Raj department), due to non-utilisation of funds, the CAG said.
The report pointed out that out of the total amount of non-utilised funds, Rs 42.07 crore was meant for creating database on finances.
"The 11th Finance Commission had recommended that a database on the finances of the PRIs should be developed at district, state and central levels and the same should be made easily accessible by means of computerisation," the report said.
"The data were to be collected and compiled in standard formats prescribed by the CAG. This would have facilitated comparison of performances of the PRIs among the states.
The database was, however, not developed as of May, 2008."
In August 2005, the Centre rejected the state government’s request for the extension of time and thus, the purpose of high priority to the expenditure on creation of database and maintenance of accounts for providing accurate information on the finances of PRIs was defeated," the CAG said.
The CAG also pointed towards the non-functionality of District Planning Committees (DPCs), before which Zila Panchayats were supposed to submit their development programmes, which were to include development plans of the Kshetra Panchayats and the Gram Panchayats involved.
However, since these DPCs "remained non-functional as of June 2008", despite the state government having passed an order for the constitution of these in February 2007, there was no effective monitoring of the development programmes, the CAG report said.
Underscoring these shortcomings in the functioning of PRIs in the state, the CAG has emphasised on the need for ensuring creation of a database on finances "as per recommendations of the 11th Finance Commission and the 12th Finance Commission".
The CAG has further said that the grants should be utilised in a time-bound manner to derive the intended benefit and the state government should ensure that District Planning Committees are effective and functional.
GLSV failure: Future space missions under cloud
The second failure of the Geo-Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) in a span of six months is expected to have a serious impact on Isro's three important space programmes, according to space scientists here. On April 15 this year, a GSLV, powered for the first time with an indigenous cryogenic engine, failed. On Saturday, the mission flopped following a technical snag in the first stage of the rocket.
Speaking to STOI, TIFR space scientist M N Vahia, who has had a long association with Isro, specifically mentioned three projects which could suffer a temporary setback — the Rs 425-crore second Indian moon mission, Chandrayaan-2, which will be flown by the GSLV. "Well, Saturday's failure will certainly produce delays in the second lunar programme. If my payload was being flown on this mission using a GSLV, I would certainly want this rocket to be tested and evaluated more thoroughly," he said. As of now, the mission is slated for lift off in 2013.
Also to be affected could be the nearly Rs 13,000 crore human space flight mission, for which a formal green signal is still awaited from the government, Vahia said. Isro chairman K Radhakrishnan has been quoted as saying that this flight will take off around 2015.
According to Vahia, there could be delays in launching India's communication satellites from Sriharikota because Isro is running out of cryogenic engines. With just one Russian cryogenic engine left, Isro is in a position to schedule just a single flight of the GSLV firmly in future. The Indian cryogenic engine is not operational. The question arises whether the space agency will have to depend on foreign launchers like Ariane for some more time to carry its communication satellites.
"What happened on Saturday afternoon at Sriharikota was an unnerving situation because India's reputation as a reliable space launching country has taken a serious dent," said Vahia.
Secretary of India chapter of Moon Society, Pradeep Mohandas, said: "If I were the vehicle director, I would subject all the stages of the GSLV to more exhaustive tests again before launching a flight."
Nehru Planetarium director Piyush Pandey expressed confidence that the GSLV will be used for Chandrayaan-2 though he felt "there could be a marginal delay if not a major one."
The most affected by these two GSLV failures are the scientists of Isro's Ahmedabad-based Space Application Centre whose payloads flown by this rocket have headed for the sea rather than the sky. The GSat-4, with important payloads which was carried by the GSLV, went into the Bay of Bengal on April 15 followed by GSat-5P on Saturday.
It is in this context that Pandey's remark assumes significance when he said that the next flight of the GSLV should have a dud satellite rather than an operational one which will allow the rocket to be tested.
According to other space scientists the weight of the GSat-5P, which was 2,310kg, resulted in Indian and Russian engineers having to modify the parts of the rocket to lift the satellite which is the heaviest payload ever to be flown by an Indian rocket.
Eminent astrophysicist S M Chitre however sounded a note of optimism when he said: "We will succeed and we should not give up the capabilities of the GSLV."
Read more: GLSV failure: Future space missions under cloud - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/GLSV-failure-Future-space-missions-under-cloud/articleshow/7164778.cms#ixzz19IgDPyTl
Speaking to STOI, TIFR space scientist M N Vahia, who has had a long association with Isro, specifically mentioned three projects which could suffer a temporary setback — the Rs 425-crore second Indian moon mission, Chandrayaan-2, which will be flown by the GSLV. "Well, Saturday's failure will certainly produce delays in the second lunar programme. If my payload was being flown on this mission using a GSLV, I would certainly want this rocket to be tested and evaluated more thoroughly," he said. As of now, the mission is slated for lift off in 2013.
Also to be affected could be the nearly Rs 13,000 crore human space flight mission, for which a formal green signal is still awaited from the government, Vahia said. Isro chairman K Radhakrishnan has been quoted as saying that this flight will take off around 2015.
According to Vahia, there could be delays in launching India's communication satellites from Sriharikota because Isro is running out of cryogenic engines. With just one Russian cryogenic engine left, Isro is in a position to schedule just a single flight of the GSLV firmly in future. The Indian cryogenic engine is not operational. The question arises whether the space agency will have to depend on foreign launchers like Ariane for some more time to carry its communication satellites.
"What happened on Saturday afternoon at Sriharikota was an unnerving situation because India's reputation as a reliable space launching country has taken a serious dent," said Vahia.
Secretary of India chapter of Moon Society, Pradeep Mohandas, said: "If I were the vehicle director, I would subject all the stages of the GSLV to more exhaustive tests again before launching a flight."
Nehru Planetarium director Piyush Pandey expressed confidence that the GSLV will be used for Chandrayaan-2 though he felt "there could be a marginal delay if not a major one."
The most affected by these two GSLV failures are the scientists of Isro's Ahmedabad-based Space Application Centre whose payloads flown by this rocket have headed for the sea rather than the sky. The GSat-4, with important payloads which was carried by the GSLV, went into the Bay of Bengal on April 15 followed by GSat-5P on Saturday.
It is in this context that Pandey's remark assumes significance when he said that the next flight of the GSLV should have a dud satellite rather than an operational one which will allow the rocket to be tested.
According to other space scientists the weight of the GSat-5P, which was 2,310kg, resulted in Indian and Russian engineers having to modify the parts of the rocket to lift the satellite which is the heaviest payload ever to be flown by an Indian rocket.
Eminent astrophysicist S M Chitre however sounded a note of optimism when he said: "We will succeed and we should not give up the capabilities of the GSLV."
Read more: GLSV failure: Future space missions under cloud - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/GLSV-failure-Future-space-missions-under-cloud/articleshow/7164778.cms#ixzz19IgDPyTl
Isro checks rocket failure data
India’s top space scientists are analysing data to find out what caused the satellite launch to fail yesterday and an expert committee is likely to be formed soon.
“Teams are looking at the data to find out the reason,” said Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro) spokesperson S. Satish.
“A failure analysis committee is likely to be formed in the next one or two days,” he added.
Yesterday, a launcher rocket carrying India’s heaviest communication satellite exploded within a minute after lift-off from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh.
Initial data indicated that the control command signals from the rocket’s onboard computer failed to reach the first-stage circuits, causing the vehicle to lose altitude, veer off its flight path and crack up under the heavy load on its structure, Isro chairman K. Radhakrishnan said yesterday.
Top scientists today said they suspected that a connector chord, which takes the signal down, had snapped.
The committee to be formed is expected to be similar to the one set up after the failure of another satellite, the GSLV-D3, on April 15.
The officials, among them multi-disciplinary experts, concluded that the primary cause for the failure was the sudden loss of thrust in one of the four liquid propellant strap-on stages just 0.2 seconds after lift-off.
With only three strap-on stages working, there was significant reduction in the control capability. The vehicle altitude could be controlled till about 50 seconds.
U.R. Rao, a veteran space scientist, has strongly vouched for the robustness of the indigenously-built GSLV, saying it was a well-proved rocket and that “quality problem” led to its failure. He said unlike the GSLV failure on April 15 when the fault was at the cryogenic stage, the problem yesterday was at the first stage itself.
Rao said the first stage is “well-proven” and “we must be able to get back to the rails very quickly”.
“Once in a while, these things (failures) do happen. It has happened with Ariane (European space consortium) and Shuttle (of Nasa),” he pointed out.
Rao said he did not foresee any impact of yesterday’s launch failure on India’s space programme, but acknowledged that it would take time to “sort out enormous data” and find out the ”problem” that led to the unsuccessful mission.
He also said he believes that the failure would not lead to a delay in the 2013-scheduled Chandrayaan-2 mission.
“Teams are looking at the data to find out the reason,” said Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro) spokesperson S. Satish.
“A failure analysis committee is likely to be formed in the next one or two days,” he added.
Yesterday, a launcher rocket carrying India’s heaviest communication satellite exploded within a minute after lift-off from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh.
Initial data indicated that the control command signals from the rocket’s onboard computer failed to reach the first-stage circuits, causing the vehicle to lose altitude, veer off its flight path and crack up under the heavy load on its structure, Isro chairman K. Radhakrishnan said yesterday.
Top scientists today said they suspected that a connector chord, which takes the signal down, had snapped.
The committee to be formed is expected to be similar to the one set up after the failure of another satellite, the GSLV-D3, on April 15.
The officials, among them multi-disciplinary experts, concluded that the primary cause for the failure was the sudden loss of thrust in one of the four liquid propellant strap-on stages just 0.2 seconds after lift-off.
With only three strap-on stages working, there was significant reduction in the control capability. The vehicle altitude could be controlled till about 50 seconds.
U.R. Rao, a veteran space scientist, has strongly vouched for the robustness of the indigenously-built GSLV, saying it was a well-proved rocket and that “quality problem” led to its failure. He said unlike the GSLV failure on April 15 when the fault was at the cryogenic stage, the problem yesterday was at the first stage itself.
Rao said the first stage is “well-proven” and “we must be able to get back to the rails very quickly”.
“Once in a while, these things (failures) do happen. It has happened with Ariane (European space consortium) and Shuttle (of Nasa),” he pointed out.
Rao said he did not foresee any impact of yesterday’s launch failure on India’s space programme, but acknowledged that it would take time to “sort out enormous data” and find out the ”problem” that led to the unsuccessful mission.
He also said he believes that the failure would not lead to a delay in the 2013-scheduled Chandrayaan-2 mission.
China's dams in Xinjiang region trigger concerns in Kazakhstan
China's dam-building spree in its far-west Xinjiang region has triggered concerns in the neighbouring Kazakhstan, where officials say two main rivers have begun to see water-levels recede at an alarming rate.
Officials from the Central Asian nation are expected to raise the issue with Beijing early next year and press for more information on hydro-projects in Xinjiang, officials in the Kazakh government told The Hindu.
The Irtysh and Ili rivers, crucial to Kazakhstan's water security, have their source in Xinjiang. Since 2000, China has accelerated development in the region, which has seen intermittent ethnic unrest.
Kazakh officials say China's development push in Xinjiang, which includes a number of dams and irrigation projects, is the main reason behind the falling water-levels in both the rivers. The rivers drain into the Balkhash lake, which sustains the livelihood of more than two million Kazakhs.
“The water flow from China is much less now than it was before,” Gabit Koishibayev, a senior counsellor at the Kazakh Embassy here who is involved in negotiations with the Chinese government, told The Hindu.
Negotiations have made little headway so far, say officials. The dispute, which stretches to over a decade, could hold crucial lessons for India in managing water-sharing issues with China over the Brahmaputra river. China's plans to build dams in the difficult terrain of Tibet are still at a nascent stage compared with its projects in Xinjiang.
Kazakhstan has, however, been reluctant to publicly voice its concerns. China is a major destination for Kazakhstan's energy exports. In both cases, China, as the upper-riparian or upstream-lying state, holds the cards, having not committed to any bilateral water-sharing treaties and being entitled to, under international laws, use the rivers' waters for hydropower generation and other projects.
As with the Brahmaputra, there are also persisting concerns that China has plans to divert the Irtysh, though in both cases Chinese officials have stressed there are no such plans.
“We are very concerned about Chinese plans concerning the Irtysh,” said Mr. Koishibayev. “We also know that they are building channels and other infrastructure in Xinjiang.”
The Balkhash lake, he said, was “losing water.” “The water level is now lower by more than two metres to what it was three decades ago. Pollution is also rising, which has affected the banks and surrounding areas. Agriculture, the health of the ecosystem and the communities around it are at risk.”
Kazakh officials fear that the Balkhash will face a similar fate to the Aral Sea, which is on the verge of disappearing because of heavy pollution. Its mismanagement is regarded as one of the world's worst environmental disasters. Chinese officials stressed that China was “paying high attention to international communication on trans-border water issues”.
China was “carrying out related works according to principles of sustainable development,” the Foreign Ministry told The Hindu in a statement. “This is also in accordance with international laws and international principles.
At the same time, we are paying high attention to international communication on trans-border water issues.”
For China, managing water resources with its neighbours is emerging as an important diplomatic challenge, as it looks to balance the demands of its own spreading water shortages, especially in the arid north and north-west, with its foreign policy priority of maintaining a “harmonious” periphery.
China, which is increasingly reluctant to be seen as ignoring the concerns of its neighbours, has over the past year appeared to co-operate more in sharing information, Kazakh officials noted, both with Kazakhstan and southern neighbours who have voiced concerns about plans for the Mekong river.
In April, Chinese officials attended a meeting of the Mekong River Commission, which China has not formally joined, and promised to cooperate on flood prevention.
“We are providing information on floods and hydrological information related to the security of people's lives and wealth both upstream and downstream,” the Foreign Ministry told The Hindu.
China and Kazakhstan are now close to signing an agreement on quality protection, which will ensure that Xinjiang's industrial development will not continue to adversely reduce water quality in the two rivers, said Mr. Koishibayev.
Officials from the Central Asian nation are expected to raise the issue with Beijing early next year and press for more information on hydro-projects in Xinjiang, officials in the Kazakh government told The Hindu.
The Irtysh and Ili rivers, crucial to Kazakhstan's water security, have their source in Xinjiang. Since 2000, China has accelerated development in the region, which has seen intermittent ethnic unrest.
Kazakh officials say China's development push in Xinjiang, which includes a number of dams and irrigation projects, is the main reason behind the falling water-levels in both the rivers. The rivers drain into the Balkhash lake, which sustains the livelihood of more than two million Kazakhs.
“The water flow from China is much less now than it was before,” Gabit Koishibayev, a senior counsellor at the Kazakh Embassy here who is involved in negotiations with the Chinese government, told The Hindu.
Negotiations have made little headway so far, say officials. The dispute, which stretches to over a decade, could hold crucial lessons for India in managing water-sharing issues with China over the Brahmaputra river. China's plans to build dams in the difficult terrain of Tibet are still at a nascent stage compared with its projects in Xinjiang.
Kazakhstan has, however, been reluctant to publicly voice its concerns. China is a major destination for Kazakhstan's energy exports. In both cases, China, as the upper-riparian or upstream-lying state, holds the cards, having not committed to any bilateral water-sharing treaties and being entitled to, under international laws, use the rivers' waters for hydropower generation and other projects.
As with the Brahmaputra, there are also persisting concerns that China has plans to divert the Irtysh, though in both cases Chinese officials have stressed there are no such plans.
“We are very concerned about Chinese plans concerning the Irtysh,” said Mr. Koishibayev. “We also know that they are building channels and other infrastructure in Xinjiang.”
The Balkhash lake, he said, was “losing water.” “The water level is now lower by more than two metres to what it was three decades ago. Pollution is also rising, which has affected the banks and surrounding areas. Agriculture, the health of the ecosystem and the communities around it are at risk.”
Kazakh officials fear that the Balkhash will face a similar fate to the Aral Sea, which is on the verge of disappearing because of heavy pollution. Its mismanagement is regarded as one of the world's worst environmental disasters. Chinese officials stressed that China was “paying high attention to international communication on trans-border water issues”.
China was “carrying out related works according to principles of sustainable development,” the Foreign Ministry told The Hindu in a statement. “This is also in accordance with international laws and international principles.
At the same time, we are paying high attention to international communication on trans-border water issues.”
For China, managing water resources with its neighbours is emerging as an important diplomatic challenge, as it looks to balance the demands of its own spreading water shortages, especially in the arid north and north-west, with its foreign policy priority of maintaining a “harmonious” periphery.
China, which is increasingly reluctant to be seen as ignoring the concerns of its neighbours, has over the past year appeared to co-operate more in sharing information, Kazakh officials noted, both with Kazakhstan and southern neighbours who have voiced concerns about plans for the Mekong river.
In April, Chinese officials attended a meeting of the Mekong River Commission, which China has not formally joined, and promised to cooperate on flood prevention.
“We are providing information on floods and hydrological information related to the security of people's lives and wealth both upstream and downstream,” the Foreign Ministry told The Hindu.
China and Kazakhstan are now close to signing an agreement on quality protection, which will ensure that Xinjiang's industrial development will not continue to adversely reduce water quality in the two rivers, said Mr. Koishibayev.
Monday, October 25, 2010
Russia's U-turn on arms sale
Russia has thrown its defence ties with Iran on the altar of its “reset” with the United States. President Dmitry Medvedev last week imposed a sweeping ban on defence sales that goes beyond even the international sanctions on Iran and is likely to have a long-term negative impact on Moscow-Tehran relations.
The decree “On Measures to Implement the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010” Mr. Medvedev signed bans supplies of Russian tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, ships, heavy artillery systems and missiles, including the S-300 air defence systems, to Iran. Russia will also stop supplying spares and components for the weapons sold earlier, and ban the transit of arms bound for Iran through its territory. The decree contains a list of Iranian officials involved in the country's nuclear programme, who will henceforth be prohibited from entering Russia.
By and large, the Russian sanctions are in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which Moscow backed, except for one crucial point: the S-300 missiles do not fall under the category of offensive weapons banned by the U.N. resolution. The move added another puzzling zigzag to Moscow's back-and-forth policy on Iran.
Resolution 1929 states: “All states shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran […] of any […] missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.” Meanwhile, the Register clearly states that its definition of missiles or missile systems “ does not include ground-to-air missiles” (emphasis added.)
In justifying Mr. Medvedev's cancellation of the S-300 deal, Russian officials refer to the U.N. resolution's call on all states “to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel.”
That said, Resolution 1929 contained no explicit ban on air defence systems and Mr. Medvedev's decree went a step too far. Ironically, defending Moscow's ban on S-300, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in the same breath, lambasted unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran as being “ethically and morally wrong” and a “violation” of the U.N. resolution.
The $800-million contract for supply of five batteries of S-300 air-defence complexes to Iran was signed in 2007. (A typical S-300 battery contains 48 missiles on 12 mobile launchers.) If delivered to Iran, the S-300 would change the rules of the game in the region. In combination with Tor-M1 short-range air-defence missiles Russia supplied to Iran in 2008, the long-range S-300s would have deterred any aerial attack on Iran.
In December 2008, the Russian government news agency, RIA-Novosti, quoting defence sources, reported that Moscow had begun “implementing” the S-300 contract. The report was later denied but Moscow continued to affirm its commitment to supply S-300 missile systems to Iran. “We have a contract to deliver these systems and we will honour it. Delays have been caused by technical problems in tuning up the systems,” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated as recently as February. Even after Resolution 1929 was approved, Russian lawmakers and arms exporters maintained that the new sanctions would not affect the delivery of S-300.
“The S-300 systems are not covered by the sanctions and work on the contract is going forward,” Mikhail Dmitriyev, Director, Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, said in June. U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley also conceded at the time that Washington had failed to secure a clear-cut ban on the supply of S-300.
However, Russian diplomats' valiant efforts to save the S-300 deal from being axed under the U.N. resolution were in vain. The Kremlin used it as a bargaining chip with the White House. The fate of the S-300 contract was apparently sealed when Mr. Medvedev paid an official visit to the U.S. in June and secured President Obama's promise to help Russia modernise its economy. On his return, Mr. Medvedev called for allying Russia with the West. “We need to build modernisation alliances with our main foreign partners … above all with Germany, Italy, the European Union and the United States of America,” he said in a keynote speech to Russian diplomats in July.
The formal ban on Russian arms exports to Iran came three months later, timed for the U.S. Congress debate on the New START, a Russian-American nuclear arms pact Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Obama signed in April.
Moscow attaches paramount importance to START ratification, seeing it as a turning point in its relations with Washington that would pave the way for other deals — U.S. endorsement of a long-pending civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries and Washington's support for Moscow's bid to join the World Trade Organisation.
The S-300 ban was designed to facilitate the START's passage through the U.S. Senate. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in mid-September approved the U.S.-Russian treaty and sent it to the Senate floor, but its ratification is still hanging in the balance. The administration would like the Senate to vote on the treaty before it breaks for the November elections on October 8 because the Democrats may see their majority reduced in the new Senate. Mr. Medvedev clearly sought to impress the American public opinion and sway hesitant U.S. Senators in favour of backing the START.
The White House “strongly” welcomed the “faithful and robust implementation” by Moscow of the U.N. sanctions resolution. “We believe President Medvedev has demonstrated leadership on holding Iran accountable to its international obligations from start to finish,” said National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer.
Mr. Medvedev's Iran arms ban is a big gift to the embattled Obama, who can now argue that his policy of “reset” with Russia is bringing tangible dividends. Moscow hopes a grateful Obama will lift the ban on high technology transfers to Russia. Time will tell whether these hopes are justified.
Sceptics point out that Russia halted its defence ties with Iran once in the past also, in the vain hope of getting U.S. aid and investments. Under a secret agreement brokered in 1995 by the then Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and U.S. Vice-President Albert Gore, Russia agreed to stop selling weapons to Iran. The deal dealt a hard blow to Russia's struggling defence industry, depriving it of what was emerging as the third largest market for Russian arms after India and China. The U.S. “thanked” Russia by pushing NATO to its doorstep and bombing out its traditional ally, Yugoslavia. In 2000, Russia pulled out of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal and resumed arms supplies to Iran.
The new ban on weapon sales to Iran will have dire consequences for Russia, critics say. Direct financial losses from the scrapping of the S-300 contract could exceed $1 billion. According to the Russian Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, Russia will lose at least $11 billion in weapon supplies to Iran through 2025. “Iran will never forgive Russia for this second sell-out in the past 15 years,” says defence expert Konstantin Makienko of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST). “Russia may lose forever the Iranian market of not only defence but also civilian technologies.”
Aviation industry sources said Iran had already stopped negotiations to acquire Russia's Tu-204SM passenger aircraft. Russia's refusal to supply S-300 systems has put a big question mark on a wide-ranging energy cooperation road map Moscow signed with Tehran just a couple of months ago.
Geopolitical costs for Russia could be even higher. “The cancellation of the S-300 contract undermines its reputation as a reliable defence partner among its current and potential customers,” Mr. Makienko said. “China will only be too happy to fill the vacuum left by Russia.”
Tehran's recent announcement that it had begun work on its own missile system, analogue of the Russian S-300, Russian experts said, was an indication that the Chinese came to Iranians' help, offering expertise gained in cloning the S-300 Russia had earlier sold to China.
As for rewards from Washington, U.S. officials warn Moscow not to expect too many. “The objective is not actually to develop a good relationship with Russia. The goal here is to advance our national security and economic interests and to promote universal values,” a senior White House official said commenting on the Russian arms ban to Iran. In fact, the Russian concession has encouraged U.S. strategists to put higher demands on Moscow. “Some Russia sceptics aren't so sure that Moscow has yet made the strategic decision to turn away from Iran and towards the United States,” Josh Rogin wrote in his blog on The Foreign Policy website.
To convince these sceptics, Russia should stop cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr nuclear reactor, tear up energy deals and support tougher economic sanctions on Tehran. To quote a relevant Russian saying: “Put a finger in his mouth and he will bite your arm off.”
The decree “On Measures to Implement the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010” Mr. Medvedev signed bans supplies of Russian tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, ships, heavy artillery systems and missiles, including the S-300 air defence systems, to Iran. Russia will also stop supplying spares and components for the weapons sold earlier, and ban the transit of arms bound for Iran through its territory. The decree contains a list of Iranian officials involved in the country's nuclear programme, who will henceforth be prohibited from entering Russia.
By and large, the Russian sanctions are in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which Moscow backed, except for one crucial point: the S-300 missiles do not fall under the category of offensive weapons banned by the U.N. resolution. The move added another puzzling zigzag to Moscow's back-and-forth policy on Iran.
Resolution 1929 states: “All states shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran […] of any […] missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.” Meanwhile, the Register clearly states that its definition of missiles or missile systems “ does not include ground-to-air missiles” (emphasis added.)
In justifying Mr. Medvedev's cancellation of the S-300 deal, Russian officials refer to the U.N. resolution's call on all states “to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel.”
That said, Resolution 1929 contained no explicit ban on air defence systems and Mr. Medvedev's decree went a step too far. Ironically, defending Moscow's ban on S-300, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in the same breath, lambasted unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran as being “ethically and morally wrong” and a “violation” of the U.N. resolution.
The $800-million contract for supply of five batteries of S-300 air-defence complexes to Iran was signed in 2007. (A typical S-300 battery contains 48 missiles on 12 mobile launchers.) If delivered to Iran, the S-300 would change the rules of the game in the region. In combination with Tor-M1 short-range air-defence missiles Russia supplied to Iran in 2008, the long-range S-300s would have deterred any aerial attack on Iran.
In December 2008, the Russian government news agency, RIA-Novosti, quoting defence sources, reported that Moscow had begun “implementing” the S-300 contract. The report was later denied but Moscow continued to affirm its commitment to supply S-300 missile systems to Iran. “We have a contract to deliver these systems and we will honour it. Delays have been caused by technical problems in tuning up the systems,” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated as recently as February. Even after Resolution 1929 was approved, Russian lawmakers and arms exporters maintained that the new sanctions would not affect the delivery of S-300.
“The S-300 systems are not covered by the sanctions and work on the contract is going forward,” Mikhail Dmitriyev, Director, Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, said in June. U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley also conceded at the time that Washington had failed to secure a clear-cut ban on the supply of S-300.
However, Russian diplomats' valiant efforts to save the S-300 deal from being axed under the U.N. resolution were in vain. The Kremlin used it as a bargaining chip with the White House. The fate of the S-300 contract was apparently sealed when Mr. Medvedev paid an official visit to the U.S. in June and secured President Obama's promise to help Russia modernise its economy. On his return, Mr. Medvedev called for allying Russia with the West. “We need to build modernisation alliances with our main foreign partners … above all with Germany, Italy, the European Union and the United States of America,” he said in a keynote speech to Russian diplomats in July.
The formal ban on Russian arms exports to Iran came three months later, timed for the U.S. Congress debate on the New START, a Russian-American nuclear arms pact Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Obama signed in April.
Moscow attaches paramount importance to START ratification, seeing it as a turning point in its relations with Washington that would pave the way for other deals — U.S. endorsement of a long-pending civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries and Washington's support for Moscow's bid to join the World Trade Organisation.
The S-300 ban was designed to facilitate the START's passage through the U.S. Senate. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in mid-September approved the U.S.-Russian treaty and sent it to the Senate floor, but its ratification is still hanging in the balance. The administration would like the Senate to vote on the treaty before it breaks for the November elections on October 8 because the Democrats may see their majority reduced in the new Senate. Mr. Medvedev clearly sought to impress the American public opinion and sway hesitant U.S. Senators in favour of backing the START.
The White House “strongly” welcomed the “faithful and robust implementation” by Moscow of the U.N. sanctions resolution. “We believe President Medvedev has demonstrated leadership on holding Iran accountable to its international obligations from start to finish,” said National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer.
Mr. Medvedev's Iran arms ban is a big gift to the embattled Obama, who can now argue that his policy of “reset” with Russia is bringing tangible dividends. Moscow hopes a grateful Obama will lift the ban on high technology transfers to Russia. Time will tell whether these hopes are justified.
Sceptics point out that Russia halted its defence ties with Iran once in the past also, in the vain hope of getting U.S. aid and investments. Under a secret agreement brokered in 1995 by the then Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and U.S. Vice-President Albert Gore, Russia agreed to stop selling weapons to Iran. The deal dealt a hard blow to Russia's struggling defence industry, depriving it of what was emerging as the third largest market for Russian arms after India and China. The U.S. “thanked” Russia by pushing NATO to its doorstep and bombing out its traditional ally, Yugoslavia. In 2000, Russia pulled out of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal and resumed arms supplies to Iran.
The new ban on weapon sales to Iran will have dire consequences for Russia, critics say. Direct financial losses from the scrapping of the S-300 contract could exceed $1 billion. According to the Russian Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, Russia will lose at least $11 billion in weapon supplies to Iran through 2025. “Iran will never forgive Russia for this second sell-out in the past 15 years,” says defence expert Konstantin Makienko of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST). “Russia may lose forever the Iranian market of not only defence but also civilian technologies.”
Aviation industry sources said Iran had already stopped negotiations to acquire Russia's Tu-204SM passenger aircraft. Russia's refusal to supply S-300 systems has put a big question mark on a wide-ranging energy cooperation road map Moscow signed with Tehran just a couple of months ago.
Geopolitical costs for Russia could be even higher. “The cancellation of the S-300 contract undermines its reputation as a reliable defence partner among its current and potential customers,” Mr. Makienko said. “China will only be too happy to fill the vacuum left by Russia.”
Tehran's recent announcement that it had begun work on its own missile system, analogue of the Russian S-300, Russian experts said, was an indication that the Chinese came to Iranians' help, offering expertise gained in cloning the S-300 Russia had earlier sold to China.
As for rewards from Washington, U.S. officials warn Moscow not to expect too many. “The objective is not actually to develop a good relationship with Russia. The goal here is to advance our national security and economic interests and to promote universal values,” a senior White House official said commenting on the Russian arms ban to Iran. In fact, the Russian concession has encouraged U.S. strategists to put higher demands on Moscow. “Some Russia sceptics aren't so sure that Moscow has yet made the strategic decision to turn away from Iran and towards the United States,” Josh Rogin wrote in his blog on The Foreign Policy website.
To convince these sceptics, Russia should stop cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr nuclear reactor, tear up energy deals and support tougher economic sanctions on Tehran. To quote a relevant Russian saying: “Put a finger in his mouth and he will bite your arm off.”
New economic idiom in Look East policy
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's civil nuclear diplomacy towards the United States, and now ‘pacifist' Japan, is viewed in East Asia as a new message to the region about India's posture as a “rising power.”
Politically more visible, though, is a bunch of economic pacts that is beginning to fill India's pocket. Dr. Singh's economic diplomacy was, therefore, in prime focus, as he held talks in Tokyo on October 25, beginning a visit to Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
East Asian leaders have often traced India's Look East policy to the diplomatic realism of former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao at a time of national crisis in the 1990s. Against this background, a dominant view in East Asia today is that Dr. Singh is setting the terms for India's long-term engagement with key regional powers. Inevitably, such diplomacy will extend beyond the economic realm. India's strategic calculations are easily discernible too.
Some officials in the region privately comment on how India has, in recent months, stayed the course of difficult trade negotiations with remarkable resoluteness. Obviously, it is not for the East Asian officials to worry about the economic fall-out these agreements might produce for the people in India, especially as seen by its various political parties.
In Japan, the political mood towards India is remarkably friendly on the economic front. A Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA/EPA) was finalised by the negotiators on both sides in time for celebration during this visit.
It took them nearly four years to firm up Tokyo's first-ever pact with a big economy. India is behind only Japan and China in Asia in terms of their macro-level gross domestic products and related indices. No less significantly, Tokyo does not have an economic pact with either its long-standing ally, the U.S., or with an immediate neighbour like the ascendant China.
In this big picture, there is considerable macro-level asymmetry between India as a developing economy and Japan as a developed country. But Tokyo has viewed its negotiations with India as a unique exercise, without worrying about striking a model agreement between a developed country and a developing economy. The secret of success, despite delays during the Japan-India talks, is said to be economic realism driven by political will. The automotive industry in the two countries and their respective services sectors required sensitive attention during the talks.
According to a Japanese negotiator, Takeshi Matsunaga, the EPA provides for “a high level of liberalisation” of tariff by both sides and places them on “an equal footing.” Also built into the agreement is India's preferred principle of free “movement of natural persons.” Not amounting to migration, this will mean a free flow of professional talent in the services sector. This will benefit both countries, with India gaining an acceptance of this principle in the first place. Investment and several other aspects of a full-fledged economic pact are also covered.
The CEPA/EPA does reflect the new-found “importance of India to Japan” in the emerging world of several rising powers and a stagnant superpower. This formula about India's “importance” was first cited by a top Japanese official in June this year, when he informed The Hindu of Tokyo's decision to begin civil nuclear talks with New Delhi. Two rounds of talks have been held so far.
The negotiators face the challenging task of harmonising a pacifist principle with a pragmatic policy. New Delhi holds its voluntary moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests as inviolable pragmatic policy.
At the other end, Japan, as an “internationalist” and a “pacifist,” might have to “suspend” or even “stop” its civil nuclear cooperation with India, if New Delhi were to test an atomic bomb once again. America's nuclear umbrellas for its allies, including Japan, are in a different category altogether. In all, however, a Japanese official, Hidenobu Sobashima, told this correspondent in Singapore a few days ago that the Japan-India civil nuclear talks “will continue.” It is, therefore, possible that Japan will not risk writing off the new “importance” of India in a hurry, especially as long as the current fluidity in global affairs persists.
In Malaysia
If the Japan-India engagement is now dictated by high stakes, New Delhi's ties with Malaysia, too, are entering a qualitatively significant phase. India and Malaysia have firmed up a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). According to a top Malaysian official, Rebecca Fatima Sta Maria, the two countries would, during Dr. Singh's visit to Kuala Lumpur at this time, announce that the legally-binding text of CECA would be signed by the end of January next year. The CECA might then come into force from July next year.
As a measure of economic pragmatism, India and Malaysia negotiated the CECA in less than one year, truly a feat of fast-track parleys. The two sides are also keen to have a genuine strategic partnership. However, the world-view of Malaysia, which belongs to the Organisation of Islamic Conference, may not always be in sync with India's on all issues. At another level, the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF)-Makkal Sakthi, which seeks to espouse the cause of Malaysian-Indian minority, wants Dr. Singh to raise issues relating to its welfare in his talks with his counterpart, Najib Tun Razak.
As a banned organisation, HINDRAF has added the Tamil label of “Makkal Sakthi,” meaning “people power” which is in vogue in this region, in a bid to stay within the ambit of law. On a related front, Mr. Najib has signalled goodwill towards Malaysian-Indians by promising, most recently, government's contribution to the education foundation set up by the Telugu Association of Malaysia.
In Vietnam
In Hanoi, Dr. Singh will have to switch from the nuances of bilateral diplomacy to the compulsions of multilateralism during India's annual summit with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India's Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN is already in force, providing a relative new framework for the summit.
At the annual East Asia Summit (EAS), Dr. Singh will be sitting with, among others, the leaders of South Korea and Singapore, with which India already has comprehensive economic pacts. But the EAS, which includes China, is a strategic forum, and this aspect will get heightened with the likely admission of the U.S. and Russia into this organisation. Issues of acute sensitivity to all major powers will then arise, especially in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) forum, which might be co-opted by an expanding EAS as its security wing.
There are already indications that the issues might range from the long-term U.S. role in the region to the perceived flashpoints in the South China Sea or East China Sea or even Kashmir.
Politically more visible, though, is a bunch of economic pacts that is beginning to fill India's pocket. Dr. Singh's economic diplomacy was, therefore, in prime focus, as he held talks in Tokyo on October 25, beginning a visit to Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
East Asian leaders have often traced India's Look East policy to the diplomatic realism of former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao at a time of national crisis in the 1990s. Against this background, a dominant view in East Asia today is that Dr. Singh is setting the terms for India's long-term engagement with key regional powers. Inevitably, such diplomacy will extend beyond the economic realm. India's strategic calculations are easily discernible too.
Some officials in the region privately comment on how India has, in recent months, stayed the course of difficult trade negotiations with remarkable resoluteness. Obviously, it is not for the East Asian officials to worry about the economic fall-out these agreements might produce for the people in India, especially as seen by its various political parties.
In Japan, the political mood towards India is remarkably friendly on the economic front. A Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA/EPA) was finalised by the negotiators on both sides in time for celebration during this visit.
It took them nearly four years to firm up Tokyo's first-ever pact with a big economy. India is behind only Japan and China in Asia in terms of their macro-level gross domestic products and related indices. No less significantly, Tokyo does not have an economic pact with either its long-standing ally, the U.S., or with an immediate neighbour like the ascendant China.
In this big picture, there is considerable macro-level asymmetry between India as a developing economy and Japan as a developed country. But Tokyo has viewed its negotiations with India as a unique exercise, without worrying about striking a model agreement between a developed country and a developing economy. The secret of success, despite delays during the Japan-India talks, is said to be economic realism driven by political will. The automotive industry in the two countries and their respective services sectors required sensitive attention during the talks.
According to a Japanese negotiator, Takeshi Matsunaga, the EPA provides for “a high level of liberalisation” of tariff by both sides and places them on “an equal footing.” Also built into the agreement is India's preferred principle of free “movement of natural persons.” Not amounting to migration, this will mean a free flow of professional talent in the services sector. This will benefit both countries, with India gaining an acceptance of this principle in the first place. Investment and several other aspects of a full-fledged economic pact are also covered.
The CEPA/EPA does reflect the new-found “importance of India to Japan” in the emerging world of several rising powers and a stagnant superpower. This formula about India's “importance” was first cited by a top Japanese official in June this year, when he informed The Hindu of Tokyo's decision to begin civil nuclear talks with New Delhi. Two rounds of talks have been held so far.
The negotiators face the challenging task of harmonising a pacifist principle with a pragmatic policy. New Delhi holds its voluntary moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests as inviolable pragmatic policy.
At the other end, Japan, as an “internationalist” and a “pacifist,” might have to “suspend” or even “stop” its civil nuclear cooperation with India, if New Delhi were to test an atomic bomb once again. America's nuclear umbrellas for its allies, including Japan, are in a different category altogether. In all, however, a Japanese official, Hidenobu Sobashima, told this correspondent in Singapore a few days ago that the Japan-India civil nuclear talks “will continue.” It is, therefore, possible that Japan will not risk writing off the new “importance” of India in a hurry, especially as long as the current fluidity in global affairs persists.
In Malaysia
If the Japan-India engagement is now dictated by high stakes, New Delhi's ties with Malaysia, too, are entering a qualitatively significant phase. India and Malaysia have firmed up a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). According to a top Malaysian official, Rebecca Fatima Sta Maria, the two countries would, during Dr. Singh's visit to Kuala Lumpur at this time, announce that the legally-binding text of CECA would be signed by the end of January next year. The CECA might then come into force from July next year.
As a measure of economic pragmatism, India and Malaysia negotiated the CECA in less than one year, truly a feat of fast-track parleys. The two sides are also keen to have a genuine strategic partnership. However, the world-view of Malaysia, which belongs to the Organisation of Islamic Conference, may not always be in sync with India's on all issues. At another level, the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF)-Makkal Sakthi, which seeks to espouse the cause of Malaysian-Indian minority, wants Dr. Singh to raise issues relating to its welfare in his talks with his counterpart, Najib Tun Razak.
As a banned organisation, HINDRAF has added the Tamil label of “Makkal Sakthi,” meaning “people power” which is in vogue in this region, in a bid to stay within the ambit of law. On a related front, Mr. Najib has signalled goodwill towards Malaysian-Indians by promising, most recently, government's contribution to the education foundation set up by the Telugu Association of Malaysia.
In Vietnam
In Hanoi, Dr. Singh will have to switch from the nuances of bilateral diplomacy to the compulsions of multilateralism during India's annual summit with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India's Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN is already in force, providing a relative new framework for the summit.
At the annual East Asia Summit (EAS), Dr. Singh will be sitting with, among others, the leaders of South Korea and Singapore, with which India already has comprehensive economic pacts. But the EAS, which includes China, is a strategic forum, and this aspect will get heightened with the likely admission of the U.S. and Russia into this organisation. Issues of acute sensitivity to all major powers will then arise, especially in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) forum, which might be co-opted by an expanding EAS as its security wing.
There are already indications that the issues might range from the long-term U.S. role in the region to the perceived flashpoints in the South China Sea or East China Sea or even Kashmir.
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