Wednesday, September 29, 2010

The meaning of Turkey's referendum

Turkey's political system rooted in the tradition of its founder President Kemal Ataturk and underwritten by its armed forces has suffered a mortal blow. A referendum held under the watch of the government led by the Justice and Developed Party (AKP) has effectively ended the military's commanding position within the Turkish establishment.

Fifty eight per cent of the voters who participated in the referendum approved amendments to 26 Articles, which included provisions to lift the immunity enjoyed by officers who plotted the 1980 coup. The present Constitution was formulated in the aftermath of this coup, the third in Turkey's turbulent history. It was arguably also its bloodiest, as an estimated 5,000 people were killed in its wake. In the reign of terror that followed, around 600,000 were detained, while hundreds of thousands were tortured or simply disappeared.

The September 12 vote brought about key changes in the Constitutional Court, Turkey's top judicial body, which has so far played a leading role in anchoring the Kemalist legacy. The Court reviews the laws to determine whether they conform to the Constitution. It is also empowered to sit in judgment of criminal cases involving the President, the Cabinet members and judges.

Following the referendum, the President will no longer have the sole prerogative of appointing judges to this body — a measure which critics say has allowed the influential military apparatus to play a decisive role when dealing with contentious issues. The vote also limits the Constitutional Court's influence over political parties which, in the past, have been frequently banned, apparently to enforce Turkey's iron-clad secularism.

The referendum marks a firm rejection of the military's hegemony over the Turkish establishment. By undermining the pervasive powers of the armed forces, what do the Turks and their current crop of leaders hope to achieve? Is Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the architect of the referendum and leader of the AKP — a party with Islamic roots — engaged in a process of turning secular Turkey into a theocracy? Is he an Ottoman-era revivalist or a leader who, in tune with the supposed aspirations of Turks, wants to fast-track Turkey's entry into the European Union by expediting democratisation?

Since it came to power in 2002, the AKP leadership has repeatedly reinforced its political commitment to a democratic and secular state, which does not suppress the emergence of a modern Muslim cultural identity. It has also expressed its aspiration of carving out a distinct Turkish national identity, which is neither European nor a 21st century clone of the Ottoman Empire. It appears that the Turks now see themselves as the focal point of an emotionally integrated West Asian commonwealth, which has a thriving economic relationship with the West, especially Europe.

As Turkey reinvents itself, it appears that its political transformation is being influenced by three distinct social trends.

First, its obsession with Europe is losing some of its gloss. A majority of Turks no longer see Europe as a continent that symbolises modernity and progress. A recent Transatlantic Trends survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund shows that only 38 per cent of Turks are now looking for an EU membership for their country. This is a precipitous drop from 2004, when a vociferous three-fourths of the Turkish respondents sought the EU membership.

Conversely, West Asia's appeal as a region that requires greater engagement is rising rapidly within Turkey. In 2009, only 10 per cent of the Turks wanted closer foreign policy ties with their neighbours to the southeast. But that number has doubled in one year. Third, and perhaps the most significant, Turks are showing a deeper respect for their own national identity. Nearly 34 per cent of the respondents, an all-time high, want Turkey to act alone, and plan its own agenda on the international stage.

As its leaders listen and Turkey introspects, it is finding comfort in retaining, if not reinforcing, its democratic and secular credentials. President Erdogan went to great lengths to talk about Turkey's deepening commitment to democracy soon after the positive outcome of the referendum. “Our faith and trust in democracy has again been seen. We understood once again that the place to solve all kinds of problems is democratic politics and that we can find a solution within democracy for all issues. The power of democracy, the power of politics, and the power of the nation all grew greatly today.” The referendum, he stressed, had delivered the message that Turkey supported “advanced democracy and freedoms”.

However, unlike in the past, the political context in which Mr. Erdogan expressed his support for democratic values has fundamentally changed. During the Kemalist era, the push for democracy and secularism was accompanied by a rejection of Islam. But Mr. Erdogan does not see a fundamental contradiction between democracy and Islam. In his view, it is not only necessary to promote democracy but also deepen Turkey's Muslim cultural roots and identity, in tune with the demands of a modern and advanced society. In an article that appeared on the website opendemocracy.net, Turkish columnist Mustafa Akyol wrote: “A group of theologians at Ankara University is examining early Islamic sources in order to distinguish core elements from the accretions of later history.” He pointed out that this group is supported by the Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi, the Turkish Republic's official religious body, to re-examine the Hadith. The Hadith are narrations of the words and deeds of Prophet Mohammad. Mr. Akyol says that “in comparison with the Koran, the Hadith are collectively of huge length, and full of minute details about how a Muslim should live.” Much of the Sharia or Islamic Law is based on the Hadith. This scholastic project, once completed and debated threadbare, could have wide-ranging implications within Turkey and the region beyond.

Turkey's novel recourse to evolutionary Islam and democracy has caught the imagination of people in West Asia. The Turkish model in which Republican values are seen cohabiting peacefully with religious thought has benefited Ankara's foreign policy as well. Turkey's support for the Palestinians and its bold confrontation with Israel in the wake of the Gaza-bound Mavi Marmara relief boat incident appear to have touched an emotional chord with the people in the region. Turkey's outreach to Iran to defuse the crisis surrounding its nuclear programme and its refusal to vote for fresh sanctions against Tehran have also made a difference to its regional standing. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has often used the word “family” while describing neighbouring West Asian countries. However, the same nomenclature does not apply to Ankara's European neighbourhood, which is better recognised as an avenue for Turkey's economic accomplishments in the future.

The referendum is part of a much bigger endeavour that Turkey has visualised for itself. Riding on the popularity of the vote, the AKP is now expecting spectacular electoral success in next year's parliamentary polls. Mr. Erdogan has already stated that once elected, he will draw up a brand new Constitution that will remove all legal vestiges of authoritarian rule, and begin a new era of progress.

However, major obstacles are yet to be overcome — before Mr. Erdogan achieves his maximalist objectives. For instance, the Turkish government has to show great sensitivity towards healing the psychological wounds inflicted by the 1980 coup. A display of vendetta against the coup leaders and their junior affiliates is not an option, as it is bound to be divisive. On the contrary, excessive restraint will hardly be sufficient to deter the military to stay out of politics or ease the prolonged agony of the victims. In order to strike the right balance, serious consideration is being given to the establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Committees. These committees could decide on re-opening cases, awarding amnesty wherever appropriate, and go into great depths to rule on the nature and content of compensation for the families of the victims. Despite the popularity of the vote, there are many sections, including Turkey's Muslim and non-Muslim minorities, which the AKP needs to reassure as it reinforces its political consolidation.

The integration of the Kurds in the national mainstream continues to pose a major challenge. Among the non-Muslim minorities, the problems of Armenians, who hold legitimate historical grievances traceable to the First World War-era, also need to be addressed. As its model of a secular and democratic Muslim majority state at a cross-roads of Europe and Asia takes root, Turkey is bound to be targeted by the al-Qaeda and its affiliates, who will see the Turkish experience as the biggest ideological threat to global jihad. The challenges are enormous, but Turkey is moving ahead with a rare clarity and sense of purpose to emerge as a nation that is at peace with itself, and its trouble-torn neighbourhood.

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